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A CANCER ON THE REPUBLIC:
THE ASSAULT UPON IMPARTIALITY OF
STATE COURTS AND THE CHALLENGE
TO JUDICIAL SELECTION
Donald L. Burnett, Jr.*
The story is a familiar one.  On September 17, 1787, in Philadel-
phia, citizens gathered outside Independence Hall as word spread
that the deliberations of the Constitutional Convention had con-
cluded.  Seeing Benjamin Franklin emerge from the building, a wo-
man in the crowd asked him: “[W]hat have we got—a republic or a
monarchy?”1  Without hesitation, Franklin responded, “A repub-
lic . . . if you can keep it.”2
Today, we are not keeping the republic envisioned by the fram-
ers; we are losing it.  The framers created a distinctive republic—a
constitutional republic—in which representative government was
combined with the constraint of a written charter.  Power was dis-
persed among three separate, but connected, branches of the gov-
ernment, and fundamental rights of individuals and minorities were
protected against usurpation by majorities.  For more than two cen-
turies, this republic has in all respects depended for its vitality upon
the impartiality of an independent judiciary.  At national and state
levels, however, the concept of judicial impartiality is now under
assault.  Disregarding or dismissing the differences between the ju-
diciary and the other, more partisan branches of government, pow-
erful economic and political forces across the spectrum are now
competing to control the composition of the courts, in order to cre-
ate a judiciary aligned with their special interests.  This assault
upon judicial impartiality is a growing cancer upon our constitu-
tional republic.
* Dean and Foundation Professor, University of Idaho College of Law; former
Dean and Professor, Louis D. Brandeis School of Law, University of Louisville; and
former judge, Idaho Court of Appeals.  This Article is an extension of remarks of-
fered in a panel discussion on nominating commissions and criteria, during the Ford-
ham Law School Symposium on Rethinking Judicial Selection: A Critical Appraisal of
Appointive Selection for State Court Judges, April 7, 2006.
1. Franklin’s statement was noted by Constitution signer James McHenry.  His
diary entry later appeared in 11 AM. HIST. REV. 618 (1906); see also 3 THE RECORDS
OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 app. A at 85 (Max Farrand ed., 1937).
2. 11 AM. HIST. REV. 618; 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787 app. A at 85.
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The well-publicized battles between the President and the Sen-
ate over Supreme Court nominations and other federal appoint-
ments have, until recently, diverted attention from the spread of
this cancer among the state courts.  Similarly, at both federal and
state levels, much literature has explored and counterpoised the
“independence” and the “accountability” of the judiciary, rather
than focusing on a more fundamental, unique, and essential feature
of the third branch of government: impartiality.  This Article exam-
ines judicial impartiality in the context of the state courts. Section I
endeavors to show how impartial state courts are essential to fulfil-
ling the constitutional guarantees of a republican form of govern-
ment and of due process and equal protection of the law.  Section
II describes the current assault upon the impartiality of state
courts, and Section III suggests several ways in which this cancer
on the republic can be slowed or reversed—by specific actions
within, or related to, the judicial selection process.
I. THE IMPARTIALITY IMPERATIVE
The genius of the constitutional republic created at Philadelphia
lay in its establishment of a representative democracy, coupled
with mechanisms for combating two historic forms of tyranny: the
oppression of the many by the few, and the oppression of the few
by the many.  To prevent the oppression of the many by the few,
the framers created a structural separation of powers.  In THE FED-
ERALIST PAPERS, where Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and
(to a lesser degree) John Jay advocated successfully for ratification
of the Philadelphia document, the dispersion of power received de-
tailed attention.3  In THE FEDERALIST NO. 9,4 for example, Hamil-
ton argued that the “science of politics” has advanced, revealing
that a “distribution of power into distinct departments” can pro-
vide the “means . . . by which the excellencies of republican gov-
ernment may be retained and its imperfections lessened or
avoided.”5  Thus, the legislative, executive, and judicial functions of
government would be performed separately.  Failure to maintain
this separation, wrote Madison in THE FEDERALIST NO. 47,6 would
result in an “accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and
judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and
3. See generally THE FEDERALIST PAPERS (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
4. THE FEDERALIST NO. 9 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 3, at 66-71.
5. Id. at 67.
6. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison), supra note 3, at 297-304.
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whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, [that] may justly be
pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”7
Focusing on the judicial branch in THE FEDERALIST NO. 78,8
Hamilton declared that the independence of judges, secured by
tenure during “good Behaviour,”9 was “one of the most valuable of
the modern improvements in the practice of government . . . .  [I]n
a republic it is a[n] . . . excellent barrier to the encroachments and
oppressions of the representative body.”10  “[T]he independence of
judges,” Hamilton continued, “may be an essential safeguard
against the effects of occasional ill humors in the society” and
against “injury of the private rights of particular classes of citizens,
by unjust and partial laws.”11  Judges, in Hamilton’s view, would
embody, and would themselves be subject to, the rule of law:
[A] voluminous code of laws is one of the inconveniences neces-
sarily connected with the advantages of a free government.  To
avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable
that they should be bound down by strict rules and precedents
which serve to define and point out their duty in every particular
case that comes before them . . . .”12
Thus, the framers charged the judiciary, as part of a constitu-
tional republic, to prevent the rule of law from disintegrating under
the duress of partisan forces operating in the other, more “repre-
sentative” branches of government.  The framers gave judges ten-
ure for good behavior, in order to remove the judiciary as much as
possible from the immediate pressures of majorities of the mo-
ment.  The judges would stabilize the republican government,
anchoring it in a rule of law and maintaining the structure of sepa-
rated powers.13
The framers similarly sought to prevent the oppression of the
few by the many.  In a constitutional republic, buttressed by an in-
dependent judiciary, the fundamental rights of individuals and mi-
norities would not be subject to forfeiture upon the demand of
7. Id. at 298.
8. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 3, at 463-71.
9. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
10. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78  (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 3, at 464.
11. Id. at 469.  Hamilton also explained that the courts would be obliged to treat
as void any statutes contrary to the Constitution, thereby laying the foundation of
judicial review. Id. at 465-66.
12. Id. at 470.
13. See generally Hon. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1180 (1989) (advocating that, in safeguarding the rule of law,
judges are expected, when necessary, to “stand up to what is generally supreme in a
democracy: the popular will.”).
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political majorities.  Judicial independence, as Chief Justice Rehn-
quist later observed, was “every bit as important in securing the
recognition of the rights granted by the Constitution as . . . the
declaration of those rights themselves.”14  Thus, in the nation’s his-
tory since the framing of the Constitution, the national courts have
been challenged occasionally to “stand against any winds that blow
as havens of refuge for those who might otherwise suffer because
they are helpless, weak, outnumbered, or because they are non-
conforming victims of prejudice and public excitement.”15
The benefits of a constitutional republic were so manifest to the
framers of the Constitution, and so closely related to the concept of
a federal system embracing a nation and the several states, that the
framers provided for the national government to “guarantee to
every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government.”16
This guarantee has come to be regarded, impliedly, as an obligation
on the part of each state to establish and maintain a republican
form of government.17
Because state governments are required to be republican in
form, they must be representative, reflecting the sovereignty of the
people.18  Whether they must also comprise constitutional republics
following the national model—with separated powers and indepen-
dent judiciaries—is a question that was not fully resolved by the
framers.  In THE FEDERALIST NO. 39,19 Madison contended that it
would be sufficient for the state governments and officers to re-
ceive their authority directly or indirectly from the people.20  In
14. William H. Rehnquist, An Independent Judiciary: Bulwark of the Constitution,
9 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 1, 8 (1988).
15. Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 241 (1940).
16. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4; see Duncan v. McCall, 139 U.S. 449, 461 (1891).
17. See, e.g., Appeal of Allyn, 71 A. 794 (Conn. 1909) (interpreting Article IV as
implying that states are required to maintain a republican form of government).
18. The “republican paradigm” has been described as “representative government
bottomed on the principle of popular sovereignty.” JOSEPH J. ELLIS, FOUNDING
BROTHERS 6 (2000).  Republican government also has been more broadly “under-
stood to include rule by the people, the rule of law, political virtue, and representa-
tion.” DONALD S. LUTZ, POPULAR CONSENT AND POPULAR CONTROL: WHIG
POLITICAL THEORY IN THE EARLY STATE CONSTITUTIONS 14 (1980); see also Frank
Michelman, Law’s Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1493 (1988) (“[O]nly through a mod-
ern reconsideration of republican constitutional thought can we hope to make sense
for our age of Americans’ persistent beliefs and avowals that political liberty calls for
both ‘a government of the people, by the people’ and ‘a government of laws and not
of men.’”). See generally Cass Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J.
1539 (1988).
19. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 (James Madison), supra note 3, at 236-43.
20. Id. at 237.
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THE FEDERALIST NO. 43,21 he further suggested that states might
choose various republican forms, so long as they did not interfere
with the design and operation of the national government.22  Yet it
was also Madison, as noted above, who warned against the “tyr-
anny” of “accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and
judiciary, in the same hands.”23  And Hamilton, in THE FEDERAL-
IST NO. 85,24 noted the analogy of a state constitution to the pro-
posed national constitution, with its “additional securities to
republican government.”25
Today it appears widely accepted that the “analogy” holds
true—that the national government must guarantee, and each state
must provide, a constitutionally republican form of government
which constrains the power of represented majorities.  As noted by
the Supreme Court in Duncan v. McCall :
By the constitution, a republican form of government is guaran-
tied [sic] to every state in the Union, and the distinguishing fea-
ture of that form is the right of the people to choose their own
officers for governmental administration, and pass their own
laws in virtue of the legislative power reposed in representative
bodies, whose legitimate acts may be said to be those of the peo-
ple themselves; but, while the people are thus the source of po-
litical power, their governments, national and state, have been
limited by written constitutions, and they have themselves
thereby set bounds to their own power, as against the sudden
impulses of mere majorities.26
Such “bounds to . . . power” require that state governments have
courts anchored in the rule of law and functionally differentiated
from the other branches of government.27
Further support for impartial and independent state courts can
be found in the Fourteenth Amendment, which mandates that the
states shall accord equal protection and due process of law to all
persons.28  Each of these obligations implies that courts must be
more than the puppets of represented majorities.  Although the
21. THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison), supra note 3, at 268-77.
22. Id. at 271-72.
23. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison), supra note 3, at 298; see also
supra text accompanying note 7.
24. THE FEDERALIST NO. 85 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 3, at 520-27.
25. Id. at 521.
26. 139 U.S. 449, 461 (1891).
27. See generally Peter M. Shane, Interbranch Accountability in State Government
and the Constitutional Requirement of Judicial Independence, 61 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 21 (1998).
28. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
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Federal Constitution prescribes neither the methods by which state
governments shall be organized, nor, in particular, how state court
judges shall be selected, the methods must produce judges who
can, and do, deliver upon these mandates of equal protection and
due process. 29
The relationship between judicial impartiality and due process
has been made explicit by the United States Supreme Court.30  The
Court has long recognized that due process requires the “impartial-
ity of any jury empaneled [sic] to try a cause.”31  The Court has
observed that “[t]he theory of the law is that a juror who has
formed an opinion cannot be impartial.”32  More generally, an ac-
cused is entitled to be tried by “a public tribunal free of prejudice,
passion, excitement and tyrannical power.”33  Due process de-
29. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964).  In Reynolds, the Su-
preme Court struck down an Alabama legislative reapportionment scheme that vio-
lated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 568.  The
Court differentiated the equal protection issue from a claim that the federal constitu-
tional guarantee of a republican form of government also had been violated. Id. at
583-84.  The Court noted that its earlier cases had treated disputes under Article IV,
Section 4, as nonjusticiable. Id. at 582-83. See, e.g., Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant,
241 U.S. 565, 569 (1916); Taylor v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 548, 580 (1900).  Subsequently,
however, the Court has intimated a willingness to revisit the nonjusticiability of claims
under Article IV, Section 4.  In New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 184-85
(1992), the Court said:
The view that the Guarantee Clause implicates only nonjusticiable political
questions . . . has not always been accepted . . . . See Attorney General of
Michigan ex rel. Kies v. Lowrey, 199 U.S. 233, 239, 26 S.Ct. 27, 29, 50 L.Ed.
167 (1905); Forsyth v. Hammond, 166 U.S. 506, 519, 17 S.Ct. 665, 670, 41
L.Ed. 1095 (1897); In re Duncan, 139 U.S. 449, 461-462, 11 S.Ct. 573, 577, 35
L.Ed. 219 (1891); Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162, 175-176, 22 L.Ed. 627
(1875). See also Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 563-564, 16 S.Ct. 1138,
1148, 41 L.Ed. 256 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (racial segregation “incon-
sistent with the guarantee given by the Constitution to each State of a repub-
lican form of government”).
. . .
Contemporary commentators have likewise suggested that courts should ad-
dress the merits of such claims, at least in some circumstances. See, e.g., L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 398 (2d ed. 1988); J. ELY, DEMOC-
RACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 118, and n., 122-123
(1980); W. WIECEK, THE GUARANTEE CLAUSE OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION
287-289, 300 (1972); Merritt, 88 COLUM. L. REV. at 70-78; Bonfield, The
Guarantee Clause of Article IV, Section 4: A Study in Constitutional Desue-
tude, 46 MINN. L. REV. 513, 560-565 (1962).
We need not resolve this difficult question today.
30. See, e.g., Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719 (1992).
31. Id. at 726; see also Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (1965); Irvin v. Dowd, 366
U.S. 717 (1961).
32. Irvin, 366 U.S. at 722 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 155
(1878)).
33. Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 236-37 (1940).
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mands impartiality of judges as well as jurors.34  It extends beyond
criminal cases to civil matters, as well as to cases in which decisions
are made by government officers performing quasi-judicial func-
tions.35  It requires, in all contexts, “[a] fair trial in a fair
tribunal.”36
Moreover, the equal protection doctrine, in its traditional form,
contains a similar element of fairness.  It constrains the power of a
majority and provides a safeguard against arbitrary action by re-
quiring, for example, that legislative classifications of persons be
“reasonable, not arbitrary.”37  Such classifications “must rest upon
some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to
the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circum-
stanced shall be treated alike.”38  This safeguard, like the guarantee
of due process, can be effective only if the judiciary is impartial and
independent.
In the states, therefore, no less than in the national government,
the constitutional mandate of a republican government—contain-
ing functionally differentiated powers, adhering to the rule of law,
and affording its citizens the equal protection and due process of
law—depends upon the independence of an impartial judiciary for
its fulfillment.39  Judicial impartiality implies judicial objectivity40
and resides at the core of what Justice Kennedy memorably has
called the “promise” of “neutrality.”41  Impartiality is an impera-
34. See, e.g., Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163 (1994) (discussing the need for
impartiality of military judges).
35. See Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 195 (1982) (addressing the required
impartiality of administrative hearing officers); Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238,
242 (1980) (asserting that litigants have a right, protected by the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, to “an impartial and disinterested tribunal in both
civil and criminal cases”).
36. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).
37. F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
38. Id.
39. For a thorough and spirited exposition of the connection between judicial im-
partiality and the guarantee of a republican form of government, see Luke Bierman,
Comment on Paper by Cheek and Champagne: The Judiciary as a “Republican” Insti-
tution, 39 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1385 (2003).  Bierman makes a case, not only for
impartial courts as an essential part of a republican form of state government, but also
for impartiality as a requisite of institutional legitimacy of all state courts.
40. Ryan L. Souders, A Gorilla at the Dinner Table: Partisan Judicial Elections in
the United States, 25 REV. LITIG. 529, 531 (2006).
41. Justice Kennedy has been quoted as follows: “The law makes a promise . . . .
The promise is neutrality.  If that promise is broken, the law ceases to exist.  All that’s
left is the dictate of a tyrant, or a mob.”  Joan Biskupic, Two Justices Defend Judicial
Independence, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 6, 1998, at A22.  Justice Kennedy expressed a
similar theme in his majority opinion for the Court in Romer v. Evans: “Central both
to the idea of the rule of law and to our own Constitution’s guarantee of equal protec-
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tive, not merely a policy choice to be embraced or rejected by the
states.
This constitutional imperative also has been woven into canons
of judicial ethics contained in the ABA Model Code of Judicial
Conduct (the “Code”).42  Judges are directed by the Code to “per-
form the duties of judicial office impartially and diligently,”
thereby demonstrating that they are “faithful to the law,” that they
are not “swayed by partisan interests, public clamor or fear of criti-
cism,”43 and that they have undertaken to “perform judicial duties
without bias or prejudice.”44  In order to assure not only that jus-
tice is rendered impartially, but also that the public can repose con-
fidence in the impartiality of the judiciary, the Code further
requires a judge to “disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in
which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”45
The impartiality imperative, in both its ethical and constitutional
dimensions, is more than a narrow preclusion against bias or
prejudice concerning certain persons, such as parties or their law-
yers, or against a judge’s direct personal or family stake in the out-
come of the case.  It is, more broadly, an affirmative duty to
“[maintain] an open mind in considering issues that may come
before the judge.”46  Impartiality in this sense is the core element
of fairness and neutrality in the administration of justice.
tion is the principle that government and each of its parts remain open on impartial
terms to all who seek its assistance.”  517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996).
42. See generally MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3 (2000).  The
ABA Model Code has been adopted in some form in forty-nine of the fifty states.
Leslie W. Abramson, Appearance of Impropriety: Deciding When a Judge’s Impartial-
ity “Might Reasonably Be Questioned,” 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 55, 55 (2000).  In
February, 2007, the ABA House of Delegates adopted a new Model Code of Judicial
Conduct, MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2007) [hereinafter 2007 CODE].  Ca-
non 3 of the pre-2007 Code now appears, with revisions, as Canon 2 of the new code.
2007 CODE, supra, Canon 2.
43. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT, supra note 42, Canon 3, § B(2); compare
2007 CODE, supra note 42, Canon 2, §§ 2.2 and 2.4 and related comments.
44. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT, supra note 42, Canon 3, § B(5); compare
2007 CODE, supra note 42, Canon 2, § 2.3(A).
45. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT, supra note 42, Canon 3, § E(1); compare
2007 CODE, supra note 42, Canon 2, § 2.11(A).
46. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT, supra note 42, at Preamble - Terminology
(impartiality).  Parallel language appears in the Terminology section of the new code.
2007 CODE, supra note 42, Canon 2.  Bringing an “open mind” to each case and ad-
hering to the rule of law even when an outcome is not aligned with the judge’s per-
sonal preferences are elements of professionalism that can be reinforced, not only by
ethical standards, but also by the culture in which the judge operates.  Judges are
aware of salient professional audiences in addition to case-specific, issue-shaped audi-
ences; the judges are motivated, on the whole, to earn the respect of their professional
peers. See generally LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES: A PERSPEC-
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II. THE ASSAULT UPON IMPARTIALITY OF STATE COURTS
A. The Assailing Forces
Attacks upon the impartiality of state courts usually consist ei-
ther of efforts by policy-makers or interest groups to populate the
bench with judges who will decide high-profile cases in a manner
consistent with certain preferred outcomes, or of efforts to remove
or discipline judges for making decisions at variance with those
preferences.  The latter phenomenon is often reflected in com-
plaints made to judicial disciplinary bodies by litigants who are
troubled, not by any personal conduct of the judges, but rather by
the content of their decisions.  When those judicial disciplinary
bodies decline, usually quite rightly, to act upon such complaints,
the complainants may seek legislative action or propose voter ini-
tiatives to limit the terms of the judges or to make retention of
judicial office more difficult.47  Voter initiatives may even seek to
establish extra-judicial remedies for what the proponents regard as
judicial misconduct.48  Such efforts seldom are limited to concerns
TIVE ON JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (2006).  A recent study of federal judges indicated that
“[e]ven in the most controversial cases, the law imposes a great deal of discipline, in
the sense that Republican appointees and Democratic appointees agree more often
than they disagree.” CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? AN EMPIRI-
CAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY viii (2006).  In the absence of binding
law, “the convictions of particular, flesh-and-blood judges—their own views about
how to handle difficult questions—inevitably play a role.  But the role of those views,
once uncovered by the actual data, is far more interesting than can be captured by any
simple claims about the relationship between law and politics.” Id.
47. In New Mexico, for example, the vote required to retain a judge in office has
been elevated from a simple majority to a supermajority of fifty-seven percent, mak-
ing it easier for a well-organized special interest group to block the retention of a
judge whose decisions that group does not like. See Sarah E. Saucedo, Majority Rules
Except in New Mexico: Constitutional and Policy Concerns Raised by New Mexico’s
Supermajority Requirement for Judicial Retention, 86 B.U. L. REV. 173, 186 (2006).  In
Colorado, a 2006 ballot initiative (“Amendment 40”) proposed to shorten the consti-
tutionally prescribed terms of appointed judges by increasing the frequency of their
retention elections. See State of Colorado, Analysis of the 2006 Ballot Proposals,
http://www.state.co.us/gov_dir/leg_dir/lcsstaff/bluebook/Bluebook2006.pdf (last vis-
ited Jan. 25, 2007).  Amendment 40 failed to pass, with fifty-seven percent of voters
voting against it. See William E. Raftery, The State Courts at the Ballot Box: 2006,
NCSCONLINE.org, Nov. 8, 2006, http://ncsconline.org/d_comm/news_111006.html
(last visited Feb. 21, 2007).
48. Two examples stand out at the time of this writing in 2006.  In Montana, the
2006 general election ballot included a Constitutional Initiative No. 98, allowing the
direct recall of state supreme court justices for any reason. BRAD JOHNSON, MON-
TANA SECRETARY OF STATE, 2006 VOTER INFORMATION PAMPHLET 19-24, http://sos.
mt.gov (follow “Elections” hyperlink, then “2006 Voter Information Pamphlet”
hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 25, 2007).  The Montana initiative was removed prior to
the election due to fraudulent signatures. See Raftery, supra note 47.  In South Da-
kota, the 2006 general election ballot included a more radical measure, Constitutional
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about judicial competence and diligence, which could be addressed
by existing systems of judicial discipline in the state courts.49
Rather, these efforts are designed to prune the judiciary of individ-
uals considered to be sources of aberrant decisions,50 and to send
an intimidating message to the rest of the judges.51
Interest groups recognize, of course, that there would be less
need to create new systems and standards for removal of judges if
the groups could exert greater control over the selection of judges
in the first place.  Accordingly, the efforts of interest groups have
become increasingly prominent in judicial selection processes, par-
ticularly in campaigns where judges are subject to contested elec-
Initiative E (popularly known as the “Jail 4 Judges” initiative), providing for a special
grand jury “to expose these decision makers [judges and other governmental decision-
makers] to fines and jail, and strip them of public insurance coverage and up to one-
half of their retirement benefits, for making decisions which break rules defined by
the special grand jurors.” CHRIS NELSON, SOUTH DAKOTA SECRETARY OF STATE,
2006 BALLOT QUESTIONS 4, http://www.sdsos.gov (follow “Past Elections” hyperlink,
then “2006 Voter Information” hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 25, 2007).  The South Da-
kota initiative failed to pass, with eighty-nine percent of voters voting against it. See
Raftery, supra note 47.
49. The California Constitution, for example, provides that a Commission on Judi-
cial Performance may censure or remove a judge for engaging in “willful misconduct
in office, persistent failure or inability to perform the judge’s duties, habitual intem-
perance in the use of intoxicants or drugs, or conduct prejudicial to the administration
of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute.” CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 18(d).
50. In Florida, a group known as Citizens for Judicial Accountability has advo-
cated that “[c]omplaints of misconduct against judges . . . be investigated even if it
involves their decisions, procedural rules or the merits of the case, particularly where
the judges fail to follow the law and rules and falsify, and/or disregard the facts and
evidence,” and that “judges and lawyers [be held] responsible for their behavior to
litigants, and make them accountable and subject them to penalties for the abuse and
violation of the guidelines of the laws and rules.”  Citizens for Judicial Accountability,
Homepage, http://www.judicialaccountability.org (follow “Our Goal” hyperlink) (last
visited Jan. 25, 2007).  Judges may be targeted in federal courts as well as in the state
courts.  The Eagle Forum, for example, has advocated broader impeachment of fed-
eral judges: “Article III states that ‘The Judges, both of the Supreme and inferior
Courts, shall hold their offices during good behavior,’ and it is not ‘good behavior’ to
hand down rulings based on personal social views rather than the Constitution’s
words.”  Phyllis Schlafly, It’s Time to Hold Federal Judges Accountable, PHYLLIS
SCHLAFLY REP., Mar. 1997, http://www.eagleforum.org/psr (scroll down to “March
1997 Issue” and follow “It’s Time to Hold Federal Judges Accountable” hyperlink)
(last visited Jan. 25, 2007).  For a compendium of voter initiatives or referenda in 2006
(as of this writing), see Molly McDonough, Voting on the Law: States Have Referenda
on Judicial Recall, Lawsuits, Term Limits, ABA J. E-REP., Oct. 27, 2006, http://www.
abanet.org/journal/ereport/oc27ballot.html.
51. See generally Julian N. Eule, Crocodiles in the Bathtub: State Courts, Voter Ini-
tiatives and the Threat of Electoral Reprisal, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 733 (1994).
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tions.52  This is an important change in the state judicial landscape.
Although interests have long been implicated by judicial selection
processes, the formation of organized and funded interest groups—
dedicated to shaping state judiciaries that will deliver preferred
outcomes on high-profile issues—is a relatively recent phenome-
non, bluntly inconsistent with the concept of an impartial
judiciary.53
In some circumstances, interest groups may form around a per-
ception that their constituents have been disfavored by state judi-
ciaries that already lack impartiality.  For the most active and well-
funded interest groups, however, the proposed remedy is not to
restore impartiality; rather, it is to advance a preferred counter-
partiality on high-profile issues.54  Interest group action to influ-
ence the selection of judges has become increasingly vigorous as
state courts increasingly have been drawn into business climate is-
sues or “hot button” social questions.55  In many of the thirty-one
states where some or all of the appellate and general-jurisdiction
trial judges are elected,56 judicial campaigns have become freighted
with push-polls, negative advertising, and third-party advocacy.57
Spending on state judicial campaigns has risen from an estimated
$29 million in 2002 to nearly $47 million in 2004, with average
amounts expended by victorious candidates increasing from ap-
proximately $450,000 to approximately $650,000.58  Expenditures
52. This trend was apparent even in the mid-1990s. See generally Steven P. Cro-
ley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of Law, 62 U. CHI. L.
REV. 689 (1995).
53. Id. at 735-37 n.143, 740-41 nn.150-51, 752.
54. See, e.g., DEBORAH GOLDBERG ET AL., THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELEC-
TIONS 2004: REPORT ON STATE SUPREME COURT ELECTIONS, http://www.justiceat
stake.org/files/NewPoliticsReport2004.pdf (last visited Jan. 25, 2007).
55. Id. The Council of Chief Justices has launched an initiative to caution voters
not to view issues in judicial campaigns in the same way issues are viewed in cam-
paigns for other elective offices. See Tony Mauro, Chief Justices Sound Alarm on
Elections, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 21, 2006, at 8.
56. Larry C. Berkson (updated by Rachel Caufield), Judicial Selection in the
United States: A Special Report, Am. Judicature Soc’y, Judicial Selection in the States,
http://www.ajs.org/js/materials.htm (follow “Judicial Selection in the United States: A
Special Report” hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 25, 2007).  Varying methods of catego-
rizing the courts can produce differing counts of the number of states holding judicial
elections.  Some authorities put the number at thirty-nine. See, e.g., COUNCIL OF
STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES 209-11 (2002).
57. See generally ABA, AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY: REPORT OF THE ABA
COMMISSION ON SEPARATION OF POWERS AND JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE (1997);
GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 54; Michael R. Dimino, Pay No Attention to That Man
Behind the Robe: Judicial Elections, the First Amendment, and Judges as Politicians, 21
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 301 (2003).
58. GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 54, at vii.
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are “likely to spiral even higher” in 2006.59 Interest groups also
have begun increasingly to request that judicial candidates com-
plete detailed questionnaires probing their views on specific issues
likely to come before the courts.60  The thread connecting all of
these developments is a perception that the judicial branch can be
controlled, and that control may be acquired though the same po-
litical techniques that are applied to the other branches of
government.
B. Impartiality Trumped?  The First Amendment
and the “Announce Clause”
As the organized and well-funded advocacy efforts of interest
groups have grown in prevalence and impact, so have the issue-
specific campaigns of judicial candidates in the states that elect
judges.  These candidates—at the prodding (welcome or unwel-
come) of interest groups—increasingly appear to be declaring posi-
tions on issues, identifying themselves with those positions, and
securing voter approval based on those positions—regardless of
the adverse impact on judicial impartiality or on the appearance of
impartiality.  This flaunting of judicial impartiality is rationalized
by a theory that impartiality is not a constitutional imperative at
all; rather, it is a policy choice that yields to free expression under
the First Amendment.  The First Amendment, the theory implies,
trumps the guarantees of due process and equal protection under
the Fourteenth Amendment and the guarantee of republican gov-
ernment under Article IV, Section 4.  This sweeping theory was
tested in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White,61 where a First
59. Editorial, Judicial Politics Run Amok, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2006, at A24.
60. For example, a questionnaire distributed in 2006 by “Iowans Concerned
About Judges” asked whether candidates support “a judge’s choice to display the Ten
Commandments in his or her courtroom,” believe the Iowa Constitution allows stu-
dents in vocational religious studies to receive state scholarship or loan funds, believe
that the Iowa Constitution “recognizes a right to homosexual sexual relationships,” or
allows “same-sex couples . . . to enter into legal marriage.” IOWANS CONCERNED
ABOUT JUDGES, 2006 JUDICIAL VOTERS’ GUIDE QUESTIONNAIRE FOR JUDICIAL CAN-
DIDATES 2-4, http://www.iowansconcernedaboutjudges.com (follow “Survey” hyper-
link) (last visited Jan. 25, 2007).  The questionnaire also asked whether the candidate
“in the last 20 years” has ever “been a member, contributed money, volunteered time,
been employed by, been endorsed by for a campaign, received from for a campaign or
had any other affiliation” with any of approximately sixty-five organizations. Id. at 5.
For an overview of such questionnaires and judges’ responses to them, see Terry
Carter, Loaded Questionnaires?  Judicial Candidates Advised to Be Wary of Answers
Inviting Suits Challenging Canons, 5 No. 36 A.B.A. J. E-REP. 3 (2006).
61. 536 U.S. 765 (2002).  The Court intimated no view about the validity of a
“pledges or promises” clause of the type found in the ABA Model Code since 2003.
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Amendment challenge was levied against an “announce clause”
contained in the 1972 ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct, as
adopted in Minnesota.62  The theory was upheld, seemingly legiti-
mating—and plainly emboldening—the forces against judicial
impartiality.
Minnesota’s “announce clause,” in its black-letter language, pro-
hibited any judicial candidate to “announce his or her views on
disputed legal or political issues.”63  Speaking for the five-member
majority, Justice Scalia noted that the clause did not address impar-
tiality in the conventional sense of bias toward a party or a law-
yer.64  Rather, it invoked a broader notion of impartiality (or
“open-mindedness”) on issues, and in so doing—in the majority’s
view—it neither served a compelling state interest nor was nar-
rowly tailored to achieve such an interest.65  The ramifications of
the majority’s reasoning became manifest when the Court denied a
petition for certiorari66 after the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit, upon remand in the same case, determined that the logic of
White also would require invalidation of Minnesota’s prohibitions
against judicial candidates engaging in specific partisan political
acts or personally soliciting money for their campaigns.67
What, then, of Article IV, Section 4, and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment?  Focusing tightly on the First Amendment, the Supreme
Court majority in White did not address the connection between
judicial impartiality and a constitutionally republican government.
Id. at 780.  Canon 5, section A(3)(d), of the 2003 Code provides that a candidate for
judicial office “shall not, with respect to cases, controversies, or issues that are likely
to come before the court, make pledges, promises, or commitments that are inconsis-
tent with the impartial performance of the adjudicative duties of the office.” MODEL
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 42, Canon 5, § A(3)(d).  Parallel language
appears in the 2007 code.  2007 CODE, supra note 42, Canon 2, Rule 2.10(B).
62. See generally MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1972).
63. MINN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(i) (1996).
64. White, 536 U.S. at 775-79.
65. Id. at 776-78.  Justice Scalia questioned whether impartiality—which he char-
acterized in part as a lack of judicial preconceptions—ever could, or should, be fully
achieved. Id. at 778.  The Justice’s observations have been used to rationalize
whatever infringement upon impartiality results from the pressure of interest group
questionnaires.  For example, the “Iowans Concerned About Judges” claim that the
Supreme Court has said, and that it is now the “law,” that answering its questionnaire
“definitely does not hurt a judge’s fairness or impartiality” and that “it is desirable to
select judges who have preconceived views on legal issues—it shows them to be more
qualified.”  Iowans Concerned About Judges, Homepage, http://www.iowanscon-
cernedaboutjudges.com (last visited Jan. 25, 2007).
66. Dimick v. Republican Party of Minn., 126 S. Ct. 1165, 1165 (2006) (denying
certiorari).
67. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 416 F.3d 738, 766 (8th Cir. 2005).
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Neither did the majority fully analyze the connection between im-
partiality and due process or equal protection, other than to sug-
gest that state judicial elections hardly could be viewed as
inconsistent with due process if they had coexisted with the Four-
teenth Amendment for more than a century.68  The majority fur-
ther stated that impartiality regarding issues, whether
characterized as a lack of bias or as “open-mindedness,” was not
significantly advanced through the “announce clause,” and might
not be achievable or even desirable.69  The majority stopped short,
however, of opining on whether a more specific “pledges or
promises” clause—prohibiting judges and judicial candidates from
making commitments on issues or controversies likely to come
before their courts—might pass constitutional muster as a more
precise measure for assuring judicial impartiality.70
Dissenting opinions by Justices Stevens71 and Ginsburg72 called
attention to the distinctiveness of the judiciary in our system of
government, but they did not mount an argument based upon the
guarantee of a republican form of government.  They did explain,
however, the difference between judicial elections and other types
of elections, and they proclaimed the importance of safeguarding
judicial impartiality.73  Justice Stevens observed that “[t]he Court
seems to have forgotten its prior evaluation of the importance of
maintaining public confidence in the ‘disinterestedness’ of the judi-
ciary.”74  Justice Ginsburg wrote with particular emphasis about
the linkage between impartiality and due process.75  She also noted
that the Minnesota “announce clause” had received a limiting con-
68. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 782-83 (2002).
69. Id. at 780-81.  The majority appeared to see no difference between a judge’s
views, which evolve case-by-case and are always open to reconsideration upon a novel
set of facts or especially cogent legal argument, and the views of other public officials
who are held democratically accountable to carry out the voters’ mandate. Id.  Judges
properly exercising the judicial function “recognize the argumentative character of
even the views they hold unreflectively and . . . they understand that even these are, in
principle, vulnerable to a theoretical challenge they have a responsibility to meet, if
and when it arises, the best they reasonably can.” RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN
ROBES 48 (2006).
70. A special concurrence by Justice Kennedy, however, could be read as expres-
sing the view that even a “pledges or promises” clause would violate the First Amend-
ment. See White, 536 U.S. at 792-96 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also id. at 802 n.4
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 797-803 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 803-21 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 798-803 (Stevens, J., dissenting), 803-09 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 802 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 812-20 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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struction by lower courts, making it applicable specifically to a
judge publicly stating how he or she would decide disputed issues.76
With such a construction, Justice Ginsburg observed, an “announce
clause” was not overbroad; indeed, it served a vital function—pro-
tecting judicial impartiality by preventing an “end run around the
letter and spirit of . . . the pledges or promises clause.”77
Justice O’Connor cast the dispositive fifth vote with the majority,
holding the “announce clause” to be constitutionally infirm.78  Yet,
in a special concurrence, she echoed the dissenters’ concern about
the state’s interest in judicial impartiality, declaring that “even
aside from what judicial candidates may say while campaigning, the
very practice of electing judges undermines this interest.”79  She
evidently was not persuaded, however, that impartiality is imper-
missibly abridged by this “very practice” when judges and judicial
candidates declare their views on disputed issues that may come
before their courts.80  Justice O’Connor seemed to treat the impar-
tiality issue as a policy dilemma rather than a constitutional prob-
lem, observing that “[i]f the State has a problem with judicial
impartiality, it is largely one the State brought upon itself by con-
tinuing the practice of popularly electing judges.”81
In the end, the White decision may have come down to Justice
Scalia’s statement that “the First Amendment does not permit
[Minnesota] to achieve its goal [of an impartial judiciary] by leav-
ing the principle of elections in place while preventing candidates
from discussing what the elections are about.”82  Members of the
Court who ascribed primary constitutional importance to the First
Amendment appeared to treat judicial elections as being “about”
what other elections are about: identifying issues, taking positions,
and seeking voter approval based on an alignment of interests and
positions.  Conversely, those who gave primary constitutional
weight to judicial impartiality appeared to treat judicial elections—
76. Id. at 810.
77. Id. at 820.
78. Id. at 788-92 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
79. Id. at 788.
80. Id. at 792.
81. Id. at 792.
82. Id. at 788 (majority opinion) (emphasis added). See Tobin A. Sparling, Keep-
ing Up Appearances: The Constitutionality of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct’s
Prohibition of Extrajudicial Speech Creating the Appearance of Bias, 19 GEO. J. LE-
GAL ETHICS 441, 445-47 (2006) (arguing cogently that the White Court was divided
between “traditionalists,” who believe in the Hamiltonian ideal of an impartial judici-
ary, and the “revisionists,” who, ascribing to a realist viewpoint, believe the ideal is a
myth; the revisionists prevailed).
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if held at all—as being “about” the public’s opportunity to choose
individuals whom they trust to serve conscientiously and to render
justice fairly and even-handedly.  By adopting the former view of
judicial elections, and by questioning the concept of impartiality
itself, the majority framed a classic political speech issue and
awarded a trump to the First Amendment.  The Court thereby
weakened the constitutional foundations of republican govern-
ment, due process, and equal protection; it also put in doubt any
ethical constraints on judicial candidate speech.83
Until the Court speaks to this general issue again, in a context
beyond the “announce clause,” the White decision will en-
courage—and will appear to invite—further assaults upon judicial
impartiality in judicial campaigns.84  The cancer on our constitu-
tional republic will continue to grow.
III. STRENGTHENING IMPARTIALITY THROUGH JUDICIAL
SELECTION AND RELATED PROCESSES
Can the cancer be slowed, or even arrested, by improved judicial
selection methods and other measures to protect judicial impartial-
ity?  The literature has been ambivalent.  Discourses about elective
and appointive systems have concluded that neither system takes
the “politics” entirely out of judicial selection.85  Moreover, reports
83. The American Bar Association is “holding the line” against allowing judicial
candidates to make pledges, promises, or commitments.  The 2007 Code continues the
provision, adopted in 2003, that a judge or candidate for judicial office “shall not, with
respect to cases, controversies, or issues that are likely to come before the court, make
pledges, promises, or commitments that are inconsistent with the impartial perform-
ance of the adjudicative duties of the office.”  2007 CODE, supra note 42, Canon 4,
Rule 4.1(A)(13).
84. A Kansas federal district court, not within the Eighth Circuit where White
originated, recently concluded that the demise of the “announce clause” also would
require the invalidation of a “pledges or promises” clause.  Kan. Judicial Watch v.
Stout, 440 F. Supp. 2d 1209, 1231-32 (D. Kan. 2006).  For recent analyses of the White
decision and its aftermath to date, including litigation spawned in the lower federal
courts and state courts, see generally James Layman, Judicial Campaign Speech Regu-
lation: Integrity or Incentives?, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 769 (2006); Francisco R.
Maderal, Regulating Judicial Campaign Speech: Republican Party of Minnesota v.
White on Remand, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 809 (2006).
85. See generally Kermit L. Hall, Judicial Independence and the Majoritarian Diffi-
culty, in THE JUDICIAL BRANCH 60 (K. Hall & K. McGuire eds., Oxford Univ. Press
2005).  In addition to the conflict between the rule of law and purely majoritarian
government, Hall notes the age-old problem of voter apathy and ignorance in judicial
elections, characterizing it as a so-called “Rule of 80.” Id. at 73.  “That rule,” he
writes,
holds that 80 percent of the electorate does not vote in judicial elections;
that 80 percent is unable to identify candidates for judicial office; that 80
percent believes that when judges are elected, they are subject to influence
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of research on which system produces individual judges with the
highest qualifications,86 or a judiciary with the richest diversity,87
have yielded support for arguments on both sides.  A recently com-
piled bibliography on “professionalism” in judicial selection con-
tains articles on strengths and needed improvements in both
elective and appointive systems.88  The question of elective or ap-
pointive judicial selection has appeared to reach an intellectual
stalemate.
But the stalemate seems likely to break as the constitutional and
ethical foundations of judicial impartiality receive increased atten-
tion from scholars, and as the corroding effect of elections upon
judicial impartiality becomes increasingly apparent.  As noted pre-
viously in this Article, elections are now increasingly characterized
by campaigns in which candidates are positioned aggressively on
issues.  The candidates’ stances are then either supported or at-
tacked through media communications funded by interest groups
unlikely to be motivated primarily by a civic calling to good
government.89
A dark shadow is falling, fairly or unfairly, upon the perceived
integrity of judges in many states that elect judges.  Justice has
from their campaign contributors; and that, most strikingly, 80 percent of the
public favors electing judges. Id.
Hall further notes that “most Americans like to elect judges and that they do not
know what they are doing poses especially acute problems in light of the continued
judicialization of public life. Id. Compare Jeffrey W. Stempel, Malignant Democracy:
Core Fallacies Underlying Election of the Judiciary, 4 NEV. L.J. 35 (2003), with
Michael R. Dimino, Sr., The Worst Way of Selecting Judges—Except All the Others
that Have Been Tried, 32 N. KY. L. REV. 267 (2005), and Peter P. Olszewski, Sr.,
Who’s Judging Whom?  Why Popular Elections are Preferable to Merit Selection Sys-
tems, 109 PENN ST. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (2004) (contending that “merit selection” is really
“merit politics,” but also acknowledging that judicial elections could be improved
through campaign finance reform and better voter education).
86. See generally Sheldon Goldman, Judicial Selection and the Qualities that Make
a “Good” Judge, 462 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 112 (1982) (suggesting
recruitment strategies that could be adapted to either appointive or elective systems).
For a seemingly fanciful but thought-provoking treatment of what constitutes a good
judge, and of how to make any “politicking” in judicial selection transparent, see Ste-
phen Choi & Mitu Gulati, A Tournament of Judges?, 92 CAL. L. REV. 299 (2004).
87. See, e.g., James A. Wynn, Jr. & Eli P. Mazur, Judicial Diversity: Where Inde-
pendence and Accountability Meet, 67 ALB. L. REV. 775 (2004).
88. Suzanne L. Cassidy, Judicial Selection: A Selective Bibliography, 56 MERCER L.
REV. 1019 (2005) (part of symposium entitled “Judicial Professionalism in a New Era
of Judicial Selection”).
89. See supra Section II.A; see also Mauro, supra note 55, at 8; Ann Woolner, Ask
No Promises of These Political Candidates, BLOOMBERGNEWS.com, Sept. 1, 2006,
http://www.bloombergnews.com (search news “Ask No Promises”).
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been characterized as being “for sale.”90  Impartiality and the judi-
ciary’s rule-of-law function are plainly threatened.  In the words of
Justice Alan Page of the Minnesota Supreme Court:
In the vast majority of states across the country that use some
form of election to select or retain their judges, independence
and impartiality are under attack.  Not from those who would
seek the violent overthrow of our system of government, but
from judicial candidates and others who would substitute their
personal, partisan, economic, or social agenda for the rule of
law.91
Consequently, as exemplified by the Fordham Symposium of
which this Article is a part, current thinking on how to protect the
impartiality of the judiciary is gravitating toward the use and re-
finement of appointive methods of selection and related
processes.92  Although appointive systems are not free of contro-
versy,93 merit-based appointment is widely regarded as the best
method for ensuring judicial independence.94
90. See, e.g., Press Release, Justice at Stake, Senator John McCain Decries Special
Interest Influence on Judicial Campaigns (Nov. 20, 2002), available at http://faircourts.
org (follow “Press Room” hyperlink; then “News Releases” hyperlink; then “2002
and 2003 Press Releases” hyperlink).  “Our judges are trapped in a bad system under
siege by special interests groups . . . . [O]rdinary Americans believe that justice is for
sale . . . .  The perception of corruption must end.” Id.
91. Hon. Alan C. Page, Minn. Supreme Court Justice, Judicial Independence vs.
Judicial Selection: Due Process in the Balance, Address at the National Press Club
(Nov. 15, 2001), available at http://www.courts.state.mn.us (follow “News” hyperlink,
then “Speeches” hyperlink).
92. Compare Norman L. Greene, Perspectives on Judicial Selection, 56 MERCER L.
REV. 949 (2005) (focusing on appointive systems and the composition of nominating
commissions), with Symposium, Judicial Professionalism in a New Era of Judicial Se-
lection: Improving the Election of Judges, 56 MERCER L. REV. 859 (2005) (focusing on
methods to minimize the adverse impact of elections and electioneering on judicial
impartiality).
93. Appointive systems are susceptible to a charge of “back-room politics.” See,
e.g., Seth Andersen, Examining the Decline in Support for Merit Selection in the States,
67 ALB. L. REV. 793 (2004).  Moreover, post-appointment retention (yes-no) elec-
tions, as contrasted with contestable elections, have been criticized for exposing
judges to greater danger from one-issue voter insurgencies than judges would face
from real-life opponents with human frailties. See Hon. Joseph E. Lambert, Sticking
with Nonpartisan Elections, KY. J., Summer 2001, at 11.
94. See, e.g., COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, JUSTICE FOR HIRE: IM-
PROVING JUDICIAL SELECTION (2002).  In language echoing themes in THE FEDERAL-
IST PAPERS, the Committee for Economic Development, a respected organization of
business leaders and educators, has noted that appointment
is the only selection process that avoids the problems associated with elec-
tions, since it is the only method that does not require judicial candidates or
sitting judges to participate in some form of popular election to gain or re-
tain office.  Appointed judges do not need to solicit campaign contributions.
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A. Nominations and Appointments
In order to preserve (or restore) judicial impartiality, appoint-
ments must emanate from nomination systems designed to maxi-
mize the likelihood of selecting individuals who are not tied to
special interest groups and who are personally committed to the
detached and neutral administration of justice.  The nominating
commissions must be independent in their composition, transpar-
ent in their procedures, and objective in their evaluations of judi-
cial applicants.  The requirement of independence refers not only
to an upright state of mind (although members of a nominating
commission assuredly must exhibit a backbone and sense of pur-
pose), but also to a selection process structure that minimizes the
likelihood of undue influence.
A nominating commission can be independent—and perceived
as independent, which is just as important—only if a majority of its
membership is not determined by the judicial appointing authority
or by any other single source.  In Idaho, for example, the nominat-
ing commission (a single, statewide “Judicial Council”) consists of
seven members: three non-lawyer citizens appointed by the Gover-
nor (the judicial appointing authority) with the consent of the Sen-
ate, three lawyers (one of whom is a general jurisdiction trial
judge) appointed by the Idaho State Bar with the consent of the
Senate, and the Chief Justice of Idaho. 95  Of the five non-judicial
members, no more than three may be affiliated with one political
party.96  No outside source controls a majority of the body.  In con-
trast, the Kentucky Constitution provides that there shall be a “Ju-
dicial Nominating Commission” in each of the state’s judicial
circuits and that every commission will be composed of the Chief
Justice, two lawyers chosen by the state bar association, and four
non-lawyer citizen members—two from each political party—ap-
pointed by the Governor (the judicial appointing authority).97
Thus in Kentucky, the Governor controls a majority of the compo-
sition of the nominating commission.
They do not face the electoral incentive to tailor their opinions to the prefer-
ences of popular majorities.  Nor do they need to be responsive to the pres-
sure tactics of organized interests.
Id. at 33. See also Aman McLeod, If at First You Don’t Succeed: A Critical Evaluation
of Judicial Selection Reform Efforts, 107 W. VA. L. REV. 499, 505-09 (2005) (describ-
ing, in part, the effect of judicial campaigns and campaign contributions on the behav-
ior of judges).
95. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 1-2101(1) (2006).
96. Id.
97. KY. CONST. § 118(2).
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Such a structural difference can influence perceptions of inde-
pendence, and can affect behavior based on those perceptions.  In
Idaho during the late 1970s—a time when the author was executive
director of the Judicial Council—it was widely perceived (and ob-
served by the author to be true) that the Council was independent.
The Council took its independence so seriously that anyone writing
to the Council about an applicant for judicial office would create a
negative impression among Council members if he or she intimated
that the applicant had a professional or personal connection with
the Governor.  Consequently, such statements were seldom made.
In Kentucky during the 1990s, however, where the author, as a law
dean, became familiar with the bar’s impressions of the nomination
process in that state, there was a perception that circuit nominating
commissions varied in their degree of independence and that it was
not unusual in some circuits for a relationship between an appli-
cant and the Governor to be mentioned in a letter to the
commission.
A nominating commission’s actual and perceived independence,
grounded in a structure insulating it from domination by the judi-
cial appointing authority, is important to the commission’s credibil-
ity and to its capacity to conduct an objective evaluation of
applicants for judicial office.  Processes for appointment and train-
ing of commission members must emphasize the commission’s in-
dependence and the importance of producing an impartial
judiciary.  Indeed, the commitment to impartiality by judges nomi-
nated and selected is unlikely to be any stronger than the commit-
ment expressed and demonstrated by members of the nominating
commission.
Members of the commission should be chosen through a merit
screening process conducted within each constituency represented
on the commission.  Once chosen and assembled, the commission-
ers must comprise a “credible, neutral, nonpartisan, deliberative
body,”98 committed to the value of an independent, impartial judi-
ciary.  Individuals known to harbor an agenda for shaping the judi-
ciary along ideological lines should not serve on nominating
commissions.  Neither should a commission be composed of per-
sons with competing agendas; such a commission is more likely to
be engaged in a struggle for supremacy than in a cooperative
search for applicants exhibiting impartiality.
98. Symposium, The Organized Bar in Judicial Selection: What Role?, 33 U. TOL.
L. REV. 303, 312 (2002).
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Members of the nominating commission also should receive
training on fair evaluative processes and on clear criteria for deter-
mining the individuals to be nominated for judicial office.  The
processes should be transparent and conducted in accord with pub-
lished criteria and procedures.  The criteria should include an ap-
plicant’s record of  qualification—by learning, experience, and
temperament—to decide cases impartially and in accordance with
the law.  In order to nominate a candidate, the commission should
be satisfied regarding the individual’s capacity and apparent will-
ingness to be neutral—that is, to consider facts and legal arguments
even if they may lead to a conclusion that does not comport with
the individual’s personal preferences.  Related criteria for measur-
ing each applicant should include: fair-mindedness on procedural
as well as substantive matters; expertise in the law; capacity to
think and write lucidly; personal integrity; physical and mental ca-
pacity to handle the demands of the position (often underestimated
by lawyers who have heard beguiling stories about “retiring to the
bench”); judicial demeanor, including civility toward judicial col-
leagues as well as toward litigants, lawyers, and staff; administra-
tive skills in handling a caseload; and the possession of both
humility and common sense in the exercise of judicial power.99
Of course, the qualifications of eventual appointees, and the
strength of their commitment to judicial impartiality, can be no
greater than those possessed by the pool of applicants entering the
open end of the judicial selection funnel.  Individuals with high
qualifications and a deep sense of commitment to impartiality
might not step forward to enter the funnel, however—particularly
if there has been a past history of highly politicized appointments
by the governor or a record of nominations by the commission evi-
dencing coolness toward applicants of certain demographic back-
grounds or philosophical orientations.  A commission should take
99. Goldman, supra note 86, at 113-14.  In states where appointed judges must
either be reappointed or retained by election upon expiration of their terms, review
commissions similar to the nominating commissions should evaluate the judges’ per-
formance and make recommendations in light of the foregoing criteria and the follow-
ing considerations: preparation, attentiveness, control over judicial proceedings,
judicial management skills, courtesy, and quality of judicial opinions.  Symposium,
supra note 98, at 312 (citing Rachelle, DesVaux Bedke, Assistant U.S. Attorney,
Member, ABA Standing Comm. On Judicial Independence).  For a thorough treat-
ment of the subject of judicial performance evaluations, which may occur in either
appointive or elective systems, see UNIV. OF DENVER, INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT
OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., SHARED EXPECTATIONS: JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN
CONTEXT (2006), http://www.du.edu/legalinstitute (follow “Shared Expectations: Judi-
cial Accountability in Context” hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 25, 2007).
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steps to stimulate a broad array of applications, rather than merely
accepting passively whatever applications may be received.  In-
deed, given the importance of judicial appointments, it may not be
too much to suggest that nominating commissions should under-
take professionalized search processes similar to those utilized by
business organizations when hiring senior executives, or by aca-
demic institutions when hiring senior administrators and tenure-
track faculty members.  The use of search consultants could well be
appropriate.
Professional searches for qualified, impartial applicants would
represent a change in the culture of many state courts and bar or-
ganizations.  Some lawyers and judges likely would object to incor-
porating such a “proactive” outreach into judicial selection
systems.  Searches for potential judges already are occurring, how-
ever, in political circles and among interest groups, whenever judi-
cial vacancies appear.  Often, these searches are conducted quietly,
but thoroughly, by persons or interest groups with a high stake in
the outcome of judicial selections and a low regard for the value of
an impartial judiciary.  Ironically, the only stakeholders not en-
gaged in active searches are likely to be the members of the bench
and bar whose dominant interest is in an independent and impar-
tial judiciary.  This asymmetry of interests and engagement can
produce a skewed nominating and appointing process.
States that establish and sustain nomination processes meeting
all of the standards suggested above—structural independence of
the nominating commission from the appointing authority or other
sources of influence, careful selection and training of nominating
commission members, utilization of clear criteria designed to pro-
duce highly qualified judges committed to an independent and im-
partial judiciary, and engagement in  active outreach to generate a
wide array of qualified applications for judicial vacancies100—
should be rewarded with national recognition.  Even the most sour
skeptics of appointive systems, or of the “merit selection” concept,
would likely feel a sense of pride if their states were recognized by
a respected national organization, such as the American Judicature
Society, and conversely, would likely feel some competitive or pa-
100. See supra text accompanying note 99.  This compilation of elements of an opti-
mal selection system is hardly comprehensive.  There are, for instance, broader issues
concerning the methods of evaluation and retention of judges after their appointment
for a term of years. Those issues are outside the scope of this Article, but they were
broached during the Fordham Law School Symposium on April 7, 2006, and may be
addressed in the other published articles.
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rochial discomfort if other states were to receive such recognition
while theirs did not.  The time has arrived, in the evolution of
thinking about appointive systems, for a neutral national organiza-
tion to distill a list of best practices and periodically to review the
performance of the states in a manner similar to (but obviously less
regulatory than) accreditation of educational institutions by re-
gional or national organizations.  Reports of unsatisfactory, satis-
factory, or exceptional performance by states could be compiled
and publicized, together with offers of assistance to states where
performance could be improved.
B. Recusal
Beyond the process of judicial selection, there exists a supple-
mental safeguard of impartiality that is vitally linked to the consti-
tutional and ethical imperative of impartial state courts.  It is a
sitting judge’s duty of recusal.
As mentioned earlier in this Article,101 the ABA Model Code of
Judicial Conduct, at Canon 3, section E(1), provides that a judge
“shall disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the
judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned . . . .”102  This
duty arises “but [is] not limited to instances where” the judge has a
bias or prejudice relating to a party or lawyer, the judge possesses
knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts, or the judge has an eco-
nomic interest—or a relationship with a person who has more than
a de minimus interest—in the proceeding.103  A bias exhibited or
acquired in the course of seeking and obtaining judicial office logi-
cally could be the basis for such a recusal.  Indeed, under the cur-
rent version of the Code, the duty of recusal includes a
circumstance where a judge, “while a judge or candidate for judi-
cial office,” has made a “public statement that commits, or appears
to commit, the judge with respect to (i) an issue in the proceeding;
or (ii) the controversy in the proceeding.”104
101. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
102. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 42, Canon 3, § E(1).
103. Id.
104. Id. Canon 3, § E(1)(f); compare 2007 CODE, supra note 42, Canon 2,
§ 2.11(A)(5).  This section of the Code is consonant—but should not be confused—
with the Code’s general admonitions that a judge must “avoid . . . the appearance of
impropriety” and must “act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence
in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.” MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CON-
DUCT, supra note 42, Canon 2 (heading), Canon 2, § A; compare 2007 CODE, supra
note 42, Canon 1.  Canon 4 of the 2000 code further requires the judge to conduct all
extra-judicial activities so that they do not “cast reasonable doubt on the judge’s ca-
pacity to act impartially as a judge.” MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra
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Mandatory recusal, where a judge’s impartiality may be reasona-
bly questioned in the circumstances of a particular case, legitimates
and strengthens judicial independence.105  It serves as a “safety
net” for litigants and the public, protecting them against exercises
of power by judges—whether appointed or elected—who owe their
judicial offices to political or economic forces that now seek pre-
ferred outcomes in specific cases, or by judges whose impartiality
in particular cases may be reasonably questioned for any other
reason.106
Because the duty of recusal protects a litigant’s right to an im-
partial tribunal, it does not directly implicate the issue of prior re-
straint of candidate speech that the Supreme Court examined in
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White.107  Concededly, there is a
concern that mandatory recusal, whenever statements by a candi-
date have raised reasonable doubt about the individual’s impartial-
ity as a judge, may have a chilling effect on future candidate speech
and may adversely affect the numbers of judges available to hear
note 42, Canon 4, § A(1); compare 2007 CODE, supra note 42, Canon 3, § 3.1(c).
Taken together, these provisions have been deemed to prohibit an “appearance of
partiality”—a concept criticized for being overbroad and for lacking specific guidance
on what conduct may subject a judge to judicial discipline. See, e.g., Abramson, supra
note 42; Sparling, supra note 82.  Notwithstanding such criticism, the ABA has main-
tained the reference to “appearance of impropriety” in the 2007 Code, at Canon 1.  In
any event, the disqualification provisions of the pre-2007 and 2007 codes are neither
so elusive nor so punitive.  They are remedial; they provide a method—recusal—by
which a judge can steer clear of potential discipline in a doubtful case while at the
same time according to each litigant the elemental right to an impartial tribunal.
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 42, Canon 3, § E(1)(f); 2007 CODE,
supra note 42, Canon 2, § 2.11(A)(5).
105. Vincent R. Johnson, The Ethical Foundations of American Judicial Indepen-
dence, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1007, 1025-26 (2002).  Although recusal for bias or
prejudice was not available at common law, it was provided by statute, shortly after
the adoption of the Constitution, for federal judges who had interests in cases before
them or who had served as counsel in such cases; it subsequently was extended to
instances of bias in general. See generally Matthew D. Besser, Note, May I Be Re-
cused?  The Tension Between Judicial Campaign Speech and Recusal After Republican
Party of Minnesota v. White, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1197, 1215-17 (2003).  Today, by ad-
dressing cases where impartiality may reasonably be questioned, the Model Code, as
embodied in federal law and adopted by the states, reflects a growing recognition of
the importance of safeguarding case-specific judicial impartiality. MODEL CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 42, Canon 3, § E(1)(f).
106. See generally Stuart Banner, Note, Disqualifying Elected Judges from Cases
Involving Campaign Contributors, 40 STAN. L. REV. 449 (1988).
107. See generally Todd L. Wheeler, I Can’t: Ethical Responses and the Roberts
Confirmation Hearings, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1067, 1074-75 (2006).
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cases.108  Even so, the “safety net” function of recusal appears to
serve a compelling state interest.  Moreover, because the duty to
recuse turns upon a case-specific, fact-intensive inquiry into a plau-
sible connection between a candidate’s statements and the issues
before the court, recusal also appears to be narrowly tailored to its
purpose.109  Unlike judicial conduct codes, which are necessarily
broad and regulatory, the duty of recusal is narrow and remedial.
It draws its constitutional strength from its particularity.
Opponents of mandatory recusal have contended that impartial-
ity is not reasonably subject to question if the judge as a candidate
has made statements that are free from prior restraint under
White.110  Freedom from prior restraint should translate into free-
dom from recusal, the argument goes.  This facile equation, how-
ever, would deprive recusal of its “safety net” function and would
further erode whatever remains of impartial and independent state
courts in the wake of White.111  Indeed, if a litigant’s right to an
impartial tribunal were  subordinated to a judge’s freedom to har-
bor and exhibit bias, or were held hostage to the “efficiency” of
allowing biased judges to decide cases, then the law’s promise of
neutrality would truly be broken.
108. See generally Josh Clubb, Campaign Speech Above All: Republican Party of
Minnesota v. White and Its Impact on Motions to Disqualify Judges, 42 BRANDEIS L.J.
129 (2003).
109. It might be argued that recusal neither serves a compelling interest, nor is
narrowly tailored to that interest, when it is applied to cases where impartiality might
reasonably be questioned, as opposed to applying it only to cases of actual bias.  The
state’s interest, however, lies not only in combating actual bias but also in cultivating
public confidence in the judiciary and acceptance of its legitimacy.  “The need for the
judiciary to appear impartial is either as important as actual impartiality ‘or at least a
close second.’”  Besser, supra note 105, at 1222 (quoting Stephen Gillers, “If Elected,
I Promise [___]”—What Should Judicial Candidates Be Allowed to Say?, 35 IND. L.
REV. 725, 729 (2002)).
110. See, e.g., Besser, supra note 105.
111. Since White, numerous courts have subjected their states’ judicial codes “to a
raking constitutional examination, particularly regarding campaign speech, and fre-
quently have found the . . . [codes] wanting.”  Sparling, supra note 82, at 444.  Ironi-
cally, in one of the post-White decisions, where the court upheld a judge’s right to
make caustic, homophobic statements in a letter to a newspaper, the court implicitly
embraced the “safety net” function of recusal, rejecting the notion that prior restraint
and recusal standards should be the same. See Miss. Comm’n on Judicial Perform-
ance v. Wilkerson, 876 So. 2d 1006, 1012-13 (Miss. 2004).  The court saw freedom
from prior restraint and the duty of recusal as complementary:
Allowing—that is to say, forcing—judges to conceal their prejudice against
gays and lesbians would surely lead to trials with unsuspecting gays or lesbi-
ans appearing before a partial judge.  Unaware of the prejudice and not
knowing that they should seek recusal, this surely would not work to provide
a fair and impartial court to those litigants.
Id. at 1015.
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Our constitutional republic has not come to that end-game yet.
The Supreme Court has not decided that the First Amendment is
offended by mandatory recusal where a judge’s impartiality in a
specific case may reasonably be questioned.  As matters now stand,
a judge’s duty of recusal, to maintain the impartiality of the tribu-
nal and public confidence in the judiciary, remains enforceable.
Members of the bar, as officers of the legal system, have a correla-
tive duty to seek recusal when necessary to secure their clients’
right to an impartial tribunal.  These professional obligations of
judges and lawyers must be undertaken, even in discomforting situ-
ations, in order to protect judicial impartiality and to safeguard the
rule of law.
Standing up for impartiality is not easy.  Impartiality is a value
little understood or appreciated in our partisan society, but it is the
foundation of judicial independence and of our constitutional re-
public.  The forces currently assaulting the impartiality of state
courts are, like a cancer, inexorable if not confronted.  Yet, with
credible, professional selection systems designed to promote the
appointment of impartial judges, and with case-specific protection
of each litigant’s right to an impartial tribunal, the cancer can be
driven into remission.
The republic of Franklin, Hamilton, and Madison awaits our
rescue.
